This paper relates to literatures in both political science and economics. In political science, our paper builds on recent work by Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) on the effects of interventions in wars and other militarized disputes. Our paper extends this work in three ways. First, we do not focus exclusively on military interventions, but extend our examination to behind the scenes efforts by the secret services of the superpowers to install and prop up leaders in offi ce. Second, we do not limit ourselves to studying countries which are experiencing violent confl ict, but also consider interventions with limited and no casualties. This difference is signifi cant because wars and militarized disputes are relatively rare events. Third, we offer instruments for addressing questions of endogeneity, which is a serious concern because interventions may be driven by the anticipated state of the institutional environment.
As far as economics is concerned, a large literature on the effect of institutions on economic development has begun to explore the fi rst-stage determinants of institutions, including variables such as inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and colonizing strategies. Our paper differs from these in focusing on a relatively time varying determinant of institutions.
In the next section of the paper we offer a brief review of the previous literature on interventions. In Section 3 we describe our hypotheses relating interventions to institutions. In Section 4 we describe our new panel data set of interventions and outline the rationale and sources for our control variables. Section 5 describes how we address issues of identifi cation. In Section 6
we present our results, while Section 7 concludes. (Karl, 1990 and Rueschmeyer et al., 1992) . Other studies focus on the diffi culty of imposing democracy from above. (Herman and Broadhead, 1984; O'Donnell et al. 1986; Whitehead, 1991) . Yet another group of scholars fi nds that US interventions have a positive effect on democracy under some limited circumstances. (Meernik, 1996; Wantchekon and Nickerson, 1999; Enterline and Greig, 2003 Our paper has a much more distant relation to the extensive branch of the literature which looks at the success of foreign "peacekeeping" forces in ending wars (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Gilligan and Stedman 2004; Weinstein 2005) , which is in turn related to the literature on the determinants of civil war (Collier and Hoeffl er, 1998 , 2001 and 2002 World Bank 2003; Miguel, Satyanath and Sargenti, 2004) 2) FAILED: Coded as one for all periods in which a superpower initiates efforts to install a leader in offi ce, but is unsuccessful in its efforts. is very large we note that we are unable to handle a few partitioned/reunifi ed countries such as Pakistan and Yemen due to diffi culties in gathering clean data on controls for different segments of a national unit.
LITERATURE
We are aware of the fact that we may be missing some In order to ensure that we do not lose interventions in the 1947-49 period we classify these as having occurred in Period 1.
3
In conducting this analysis we are careful to ensure that we are not simply capturing a correlation that results from interventions being aimed primarily at authoritarian regimes, or by an automatic contemporaneous adjustment of the democracy score in response to an external intervention. We rule out that
we are capturing such effects by controlling for the level of democracy in the period of the intervention, and observing the effect of the intervention on democracy in the subsequent fi ve-year period. In addition we use instruments to address the endogeneity of interventions to anticipated levels of democracy.
(Our precise strategy to address endogeneity is de- We use REG as our core measure of democracy and only use Polity for conducting robustness checks. We do so because we believe that it is especially important to be wary of subjective measures of democracy in the context of this project. The subjectivity of Polity is a special concern for this paper given that Polity estimates are subjective assessments from the perspective of the western bloc, which was of course one of the participants in the Cold War. There is thus cause for concern that Polity may overstate the degree of democracy in countries in which the United States intervened. There is no such concern with respect to REG because it is behaviorally based, hinging on observed turnover in government following an election, rather than based on subjective assessments.
In addition to lagged democracy, we control for the main variables that have been identifi ed in the political science literature as infl uencing democracy. As
Przeworski and his colleagues have found, democracy is signifi cantly infl uenced by per capita GDP (Alvarez et al. 2000) . We thus include log GDP per capita as a control variable. The widest available coverage of GDP comes from the dataset created by Angus Maddison (2003) . This is of special interest to us be- Table   2 , where we use the multiple instruments offered by the GMM technique, we assess the independent effects of the numerous intervention variables listed in Section 4.
We begin Table 1 with the results for an OLS specifi cation in which we place our core measure of democracy (REG) on the left hand side, and control for the lagged dependent variable, per capita GDP, GDP growth, duration dependence, continental dummies, and time dummies (column 1). We then proceed to our core instrumental variables results. Our interest is in seeing how an intervention in a given fi ve-year period affects democracy in the subsequent fi ve-year period, and to see if this effect differs depending on whether the intervening superpower is a democracy (the US) or a dictatorship (the Soviet Union).
Column 1 of Table 1 Table 2 .)
The regressions presented so far use GDP and GDP growth data from Maddison. In columns 6-9 of Table 1 we conduct the same exercise as in columns 2-5, but using the Polity measure of democracy. (The column 1 OLS result is robust to replacing REG with Polity and is available upon request.)
As mentioned in Section 4, we do not use Polity as our core measure of democracy because this is a subjective measure (unlike REG which is behavioral).
Additionally the subjective assessments are entirely made from one side of the East-West divide, which generates the possibility of bias which could be problematic when comparing the effects of Soviet and US interventions. We have special reasons for concern about the subjectivity of the Polity measure here While US interventions emerge as signifi cant in both columns 8 and 9, the substantive effects (in terms of the percentage decline in democracy) are smaller in the Polity based specifi cations than in the REG based specifi cations (columns 4 and 5). 9 The coeffi cient for Soviet interventions is not signifi cant, but is still statistically indistinguishable from that for US interventions in both cases (p of .79 and .84 respectively).
In Table 2 we check if our core instrumental variables result, which was presented in column 2 of Table 1 , is robust to addressing endogeneity in a different way, namely via the Blundell and Bond GMM technique.
In column 1 of Table 2 we present the GMM analogue of our core instrumental variables result. The AR (2) and Hansen tests do not indicate problems with identifi cation; the null hypothesis of no AR(2) cannot be rejected (p=.64), and the same is the case for the fulfi llment of the exclusion restriction (Hansen test p value of 1). Similar to what we observed in our core IV regression, both US and Soviet interventions emerge as having signifi cant negative effects on democracy.
Since the GMM technique is based on using multiple lags of levels and differences as instruments, we are not limited to only including two endogenous intervention variables in our GMM analysis. In GMM we can thus separately examine the independent effects of onsets, offsets, counterinsurgency support, and military invasions. We now thus focus on estimating the independent effects of these variables.
Column 2 shows that both US and Soviet onsets are negatively associated with democracy (at the 5% and 10% levels respectively). US and Soviet offsets are positively associated with democracy (also at the 5% and 10% level respectively). Failed interventions and counterinsurgency support have no effect on democracy. US military interventions are positively associated with democracy here, but this latter result turns out not be robust. The regressions presented so far in Table 2 use data for GDP and GDP growth from Maddison. As mentioned, this is the appropriate source for this paper because it is the only one which offers adequate coverage of countries within the Soviet bloc. Just as we did in Table 1 we now check for the consequences of using GDP and GDP growth data from the GDNGD in place of Maddison. Recall that we should expect the result for US interventions alone to be robustly significant in GDNGD based specifi cations. Appendix Table 2 : First stage results-REG specifi cations Table 2 Column 6  Table 2 Column 7  Table 2 Column 8  Table 2 This result is based on a very small sample of invasions (Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama). As we will see later, this latter result also does not survive our robustness check using the Polity measure of democracy.
We are entirely unable to estimate the effects of Soviet military interventions and counterinsurgencies in the GDNGD specifi cations on account of missing data for Soviet bloc countries.
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